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Abstract 
Individuals in positions of leadership should possess certain qualities that allow 
them to situations of great stress and crisis.  These qualities are especially important in 
extraordinary and overwhelming circumstances such as natural disasters.  Hurricane 
Katrina, a devastating storm which hit the United States Gulf Region back in 2005, 
certainly fits into that category.  This project examines the leadership and disaster 
management efforts of prominent government officials in response to Hurricane 
Katrina; special focus is given to Ray Nagin, mayor of New Orleans at the time.  New 
Orleans was especially impacted by Katrina, and the efforts of officials at all levels of 
government would significantly influence his ability to manage the crisis brought on by 
Katrina’s devastation.  Available investigative and academic sources are utilized to 
discuss desirable leadership disaster management characteristics, the empirical numbers 
behind Katrina’s damage, actions performed by officials in Katrina’s aftermath and how 
those actions affected the local efforts of Nagin and his administration. 
Keywords: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, Ray Nagin, Disaster Management, 
Leadership   
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Introduction 
August 2015 marked the 10th anniversary of Hurricane Katrina.  The words by 
themselves are enough to elicit vivid recollections, both from those who lived through it 
and those who witnessed it unfold in real-time through the eyes of the media in a non-
stop news cycle broadcasting heartbreaking images of desperate citizens struggling to 
survive for weeks on end.  The statistics reporting the destruction in terms of human 
suffering and in property damages are staggering: at least 1,800 deaths, another 1.2 
million people displaced and approximately $110 billion in physical property damages 
(Barbier, 2015, p. 285).  As jarring as those figures are, they only tell part of the story 
when it comes to Katrina’s impact.  The entire city of New Orleans and much of the 
country’s Gulf region are still recovering from the storm’s aftermath a decade later.  As 
the areas hardest hit still continue to rebuild and recover financially as well as 
psychologically, it is appropriate to scrutinize the roles government agencies played in 
managing the immediate relief efforts that took place as a result of this hurricane. 
In the years since Katrina, many commentators have criticized the government 
officials and agencies involved in Katrina response efforts; many have gone so far as to 
make the case that the response operations carried out by these officials and agencies 
exacerbated an already tragic situation.  It has been cited numerous times as an example 
of failed government initiative, with one analysis saying it “revealed a national 
emergency management system in disarray, one that was incapable of responding 
effectively to the immediate needs of communities along the Gulf Coast and unprepared 
to coordinate the massive relief effort required to support recovery” (Waugh, p. 131).  
Such a statement suggests a pattern of inefficiency or inaction existed during the relief 
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stages, perhaps resulting from incompetence or indifference or a combination of factors.  
Is such a statement true?  If so, can it be supported by reliable sources?  Those questions 
inevitably lead to mind another important question that has surely been posed by many 
others: could any of the death and property destruction stemming from Hurricane 
Katrina have been prevented?   
This project set out to examine the coordinated relief efforts from all levels of 
government—especially by the leadership in New Orleans where the situation was most 
dire—and determine whether or not those efforts were effective.  Through firsthand 
accounts, scholarly sources and official records, this project will seek to adequately 
answer the following question: Did failures at all levels of government—particularly 
at the local level—exacerbate the damage wrought by Hurricane Katrina in New 
Orleans? 
The intent of this project is not to focus on the tangible damage caused by 
Hurricane Katrina, but to discover any relevant and specific examples of government 
inaction or ineptitude which may have impacted the ensuing response process.  In 
addition to assessing the numbers behind the storm’s physical damage, several of the 
sources referenced for this project will discuss the human side of Katrina’s aftermath. 
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Prologue 
Hurricanes are nothing new to the Gulf region.  Before Katrina, storms like 
Andrew and Hugo powered their way through the southeast United States and left their 
own substantial paths of destruction.  The Atlantic Ocean, especially that part which 
borders the east coast and the Caribbean region, is fertile territory for hurricane activity 
due to the temperature range and atmospheric conditions necessary of them to emerge.  
In 2005, there were a record 27 individually identified tropical storms; fifteen of those 
storms, another record, eventually developed into hurricanes (Van Heerden, 2006, p. 
13).  For the sake of clarification, a tropical storm sustains wind speeds from 39 to 73 
miles per hour while a hurricane is classified as any system with sustained winds of 74 
miles per hour or greater (National Hurricane Center, n.d.).  The twelfth of those 
tropical storms, later to be named Katrina, was first detected over the eastern Bahamas 
by the National Hurricane Center, the country’s preeminent authority on storm data and 
observation, on August 23, 2005 (p. 16).  Although Katrina started out like virtually 
every tropical system before or since, it would not stay ordinary for long. 
As shocking as the raw numbers of Katrina’s unprecedented destruction are to 
imagine, they only tell a party of the story behind its aftermath.  It is impossible to 
overstate the psychological trauma that afflicts survivors of life-altering events like 
natural disasters.  In the case of Katrina, that trauma was amplified through both 
personal loss and prolonged exposure to deplorable conditions.  The experiences 
recalled by survivors sound like they could be scenes out of a horror movie; there are 
firsthand accounts from residents who “reported watching corpses float by as they 
waited to escape their flooded homes” while others claimed to see police “wielding 
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guns at newly homeless people” as they herded scores of evacuees into crowded relief 
centers (Reardon, 2015, p. 395).  The impact of these and other events had serious and 
far reaching implications, Reardon also highlighted one study conducted approximately 
one year post-Katrina found that its emotional and psychological scars had far from 
receded.  This study concluded that twenty-one percent of participants in the region had 
experienced symptoms consistent with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (more 
commonly known as PTSD) while more than six percent had dealt with thoughts of 
suicide at least once (p. 396).  Another study, this one conducted in 2008, showed a 
pessimistic outlook for many of those involved in its research; more than half (59.2 
percent) of those surveyed said they believed the rebuilding efforts from Katrina would 
take more than five years to complete while eight percent believed that their community 
would never fully recover (Nicholls & Picou, 2012, p. 356). 
And what became of all those New Orleans residents who relocated to escape 
their ravaged city?  In many instances, they never returned.  It is estimated that a quarter 
of a million evacuees were taken to Houston in neighboring Texas due to overcrowded 
conditions in Louisiana.  One article written close to Katrina’s decade anniversary 
estimated that 100,000 of those people—nearly half—stayed there permanently and 
have affectively created a city within a city by virtue of not going back to their original 
homes; one of those displaced residents who remained in Houston jokingly refers to the 
city as “New Orleans West” (Dart, 2015).  The Census Bureau recorded an overall 
decline of more than 140,000 people in the Big Easy’s population between 2000 and 
2010 (Mildenberg, 2011).  Such a tremendous loss is sure to leave a huge void in 
communities throughout the Big Easy and significantly alter social, cultural and 
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economic dynamics.  A 2007 study found that predominantly African-American 
neighborhoods were 71 percent less likely to have access to multiple food grocer 
locations than the citywide average, a decline of more than thirty points from pre-
Katrina approximations (Rose, 2011, p. 484).  The case could certainly be made that 
this change is attributable to decreased populations in those neighborhoods as a result of 
mass relocations like that in Houston.  Whatever the reason, it is just one of many 
adverse impacts on the city that is still being felt to this day. 
There should be no room for doubt that the desolation of Katrina necessitated a 
monumental, well orchestrated response and recovery effort.  The particularly 
devastating impact to New Orleans placed a substantial burden on the shoulders of Ray 
Nagin to lead his city through the worst crisis in its history, all the while being 
subjected to constant media and ideological scrutiny.  Such a task would be difficult for 
the most seasoned career politician, let alone one of Nagin’s relatively novice status.  
Time would soon tell whether or not he was up to the challenge. 
 
Literature Review 
Every level of government—and more specifically, their key players—has the 
responsibility to act in times of crisis.  According to available literature on disaster 
response management, proper live-saving and disaster mitigation procedures for events 
like Katrina can be effectively broken down into three stages: pre-disaster, response and 
post-disaster.  Some of the pertinent tasks within those stages include: 
Pre-disaster: 
 Risk awareness and assessment of all possible hazards and vulnerabilities 
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 Research and training systems in place to educate first responders 
 Reliable early warning systems 
Response: 
 Providing basic amenities such as food, clothing and shelter 
 Providing medical treatment as necessary 
Post-disaster: 
 Restoring basic services lost or interrupted during the disaster itself 
 Rebuilding lost or damaged infrastructure 
 Recovery assistance programs (Todd & Todd, 2011, pp. 3-5). 
In a separate piece on disaster management, the authors summarize their assessment 
of effective emergency management in four distinct steps: hazard mitigation (such as 
levees), disaster preparedness (emergency planning), disaster response activities (aid 
relief, search and rescue missions) and disaster recovery (restoration of basic and 
essential services) (Waugh & Streib, 2006, p. 131).  Thanks to the similarities to steps 
detailed by the previous source, some basic guidelines have been established. 
What are the responsibilities of individual leaders during a crisis?  There are many 
important roles that can help answer this question; in fact, one source lists at least 
twelve desirable leadership characteristics in times of emergency or disaster.  It is no 
easy task to prioritize them, but for the sake of expediency and better analysis we will 
focus on three: decisiveness, informing and problem solving; any lack of these and other 
valuable leader traits in times like Katrina can “exacerbate the impact of crises and 
eventually cause undesirable consequences” (Demiroz & Kapucu, 2012, p. 98).  The 
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latter of those mentioned traits is especially important, with decision making considered 
to be “the key distinctive activity” for leaders during a crisis (Cosgrave, 1996, p. 28) 
among many scholars on the subject. 
The research phase of this project found many published sources pertaining to 
the important aspects of disaster leadership as well as Katrina and its aftermath.  The 
research phase found several sources on the subject of leader crisis management 
(Demiroz and Kapucu 2012; Cosgrave 1996; Waugh and Streib 2006; Todd and Todd; 
2011).  Several books examine the subject with in-depth accounts of the performances 
from officials at all levels of government before, during and after the storm (Brinkley 
2006; Cooper and Block 2006; Dyson 2006; Horne 2006; Southern 2007).  Research 
also found that the handling of the post-Katrina response efforts led to significant 
political and personal repercussions for the key players involved (Rivlin 2015; Koven 
2010; Adams 2005; Waugh 2007; Lay 2009).  Eventually, a bipartisan congressional 
investigation weighed in on the overall impact of the Katrina response and assessed the 
performances of all involved levels of government (Ink 2006; Morris 2007).  
Each level of government—and more specifically, their key players—will be 
discussed by examining facets of their respective performances in terms of proper life 
saving and disaster management procedures identified in the literature review.  Those 
identified procedures and important leadership traits will be crucial in discussing 
specific responses in the aftermath of Katrina and whether or not those responses were 
effective in mitigating the disaster.  It is important to look at the response from each 
level of government because the decisions and actions of those higher on the proverbial 
totem pole affect those below them.  The actions, or lack thereof, of officials on the 
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state and federal levels directly affect the abilities of mayors and other local officials to 
fulfill their own responsibilities.  While discussing each level response to Katrina, the 
following sub-questions will be addressed in order to ensure proper attention to the 
stated research question in the introduction: 
 Who were the key players and what were their roles? 
 What are some specific examples found during the research phase of leadership 
failures that can be attributed to the key players or their representatives? 
 How did these specific examples of leadership failure impact the management of 
Katrina’s response at the local level? 
The various investigative and scholarly sources utilized during the research 
phase of this project assess and criticize officials in numerous agencies throughout the 
bureaucratic spectrum, from local politicians all the way to individuals directly 
associated with the Bush administration.  These literary sources do not put the blame for 
leadership failures squarely on the shoulders of one person or entity, but rather indicate 
that several parties are culpable in those failures and their effects. 
 
Research Design 
The city of New Orleans serves as the major focus and case study for this 
project, as it was the area most notably impacted by Hurricane Katrina and its extensive 
damage.  According to recent data, it has a city population of approximately 350,000 
people and a greater metro area population of 1.2 million people.  African Americans 
account for 60 percent of that population, with Caucasians making up 33 percent and 
various minority groups rounding out the demographic breakdown (United States 
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Census Bureau, n.d.).  The residents of New Orleans were significantly hindered by a 
number of economic maladies at the time of Katrina’s arrival, another factor in dealing 
with its aftermath.  The citywide median household income came in at more than 
$13,000 below the national average; additionally, nine percent of those households did 
not own and had no ready access to a family vehicle (Dyson, p. 5).  These factors, 
combined with the extensive damage brought on by a natural disaster, would eventually 
create a much different city than what existed prior to Katrina’s arrival. 
The structure of this project is intended to provide a detailed logical flow of 
information that ultimately helps answer the primary research question stated in the 
introduction.  The first section examines a timeline of Hurricane Katrina, covering 
approximately two weeks, that tracks the storm and the response to it.  That timeline is 
followed by a discussion of the Katrina response from the local, state and federal 
governments and how their actions affected the necessary relief efforts.  Because of the 
scope of the disaster and the impact of the decisions made by the key players, it was 
deemed necessary to include discussion on the significant repercussions and political 
fallout resulting from those key player actions.  The project will then analyze the 
pertinent findings of the research by connecting them back to the relevant research 
literature before presenting a final conclusion on that research and why it is important. 
The central focus of this research falls on Ray Nagin, mayor of New Orleans in 
2005 when Hurricane Katrina hit.  As the city’s highest elected leader, he bore the 
primary responsibility of overseeing the coordination and execution of its most critical 
disaster response procedures from start to finish.  Furthermore, he bore the 
responsibility of ensuring adequate resources for his personnel and procuring additional 
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ones as needed while delegating tasks to subordinate officials or committees for the 
sake of efficiency.  Did he successfully fulfill his role as the city’s chief executive, or 
did he fall short in carrying out his duties?  If he did in fact fail in all or some of those 
duties, was it the result of his actions alone or a combination of factors? 
In the days following Katrina’s rampage, Nagin quickly went from unknown head 
of a mid-sized American city to an international household name.  Elected to New 
Orleans’ city hall in 2002, he won favor with voters despite his lack of political 
experience because they viewed him as a “fresh alternative” to the rampant corruption 
and cronyism which plagued previous administrations (Wilkie, 2007, p. 107).  He 
developed a reputation as a no-nonsense maverick who failed to show due deference to 
the large minority population instrumental in his electoral victory (Cooper & Block, 
2006, pp. 107-108). 
In addition to Nagin, additional key figures prominently involved in the Katrina 
response have been included in the analysis as well; their actions or those of their 
representatives are discussed for the purpose of relating the consequences of those 
actions to the local management of the Katrina response.  Again, it is not the intent of 
this project to definitely assign blame to these individuals, but to analyze how their 
performances impacted the management efforts of Nagin and other officials in New 
Orleans.  The additional key figures are as follows: 
Kathleen Blanco – Governor of Louisiana.  The first woman elected to her state’s 
highest office, Blanco was sworn in as Louisiana’s 54th governor in 2004.  She 
immediately sought to make strides in education reform, especially regarding teacher 
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quality and accountability (National Governor’s Association, 2011), but that initiative 
would quickly take a back seat to more pressing matters. 
George W. Bush – President of the United States.  Even before Katrina, he was no 
stranger to disasters on the national stage as he also presided over the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks. 
Michael Brown – Director of FEMA.  The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency was founded in 1979 under President Jimmy Carter to consolidate the nation’s 
“fragmented” emergency response apparatus (Dyson, 2006, p. 43).  Originally an 
attorney by trade, he made his way into government service as an assistant city manager 
in Oklahoma before making the move to Washington and accepting the position which 
would later make him infamous (Cooper, p. 77).  A “complicated and divisive figure” 
(p. 78), he quickly established a reputation as enthusiastic but unprepared for the 
demands of his job; that latter descriptor would eventually come into play in a big way. 
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The Storm 
A disaster of Katrina’s magnitude would be overwhelming no matter where it 
hit, but that ferocity was especially felt in the areas it hit the hardest.  The residents of 
Louisiana were certainly no strangers to hard living and daily struggles, and that 
struggle was about to get worse.  The following section highlights some major events 
leading up to, during, and proceeding Katrina; a special emphasis has been placed on 
the plight of citizens stuck in New Orleans and the immediate responses by key officials 
to manage the storm’s fallout. 
What precautions or warning systems existed prior to Katrina’s arrival?  The 
levees surrounding the city would be the most obvious answer.  Designed to “curb 
periodic and destructive floods” by helping to regulate water levels, Army engineered 
levee systems along the Mississippi River date back to the early 19th century 
(Handwerk, 2005).  Concerns on the stability of the aging levee system around New 
Orleans continued into the 21st century, when the $750 million Lake Pontchartrain and 
Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project was proposed in 2004.  The project aimed to 
rebuild and stabilize deteriorating levee and floodwater pumping station systems around 
New Orleans and neighboring parishes.  Unfortunately, it never fully came to fruition as 
it became the victim of budget cuts due to the costly war in Iraq (Dyson, p. 81). 
That same year, FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) officials 
conducted a simulated hurricane strike on New Orleans; the exercise became known as 
“Hurricane Pam” (Horne, p. 51).  The simulated study envisioned a Category 3 
hurricane hitting The Big Easy and overtaking its levees in order to produce a “worst 
case scenario” for official review.  The results of the scenario were bleak; the simulated 
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hurricane caused as much as twelve feet of water to flood the city and killed more than 
60,000 people (McQuaid, 2005).  Despite the ominous and alarming nature of those 
statistics, it is unclear if any definitive strategies were implemented as a result of the 
exercise. 
It was no secret before Katrina’s arrival that New Orleans was highly vulnerable 
to the type of calamitous damage resulting from a storm like the one simulated in the 
Hurricane Pam exercise.  Circumstances like weakened levee systems and federal 
budget considerations are well beyond the control of city executives like Nagin; it 
would be very unfair to hold them solely responsible for these factors.  What they can 
be held responsible for is how they react to the results of these circumstances, and 
Nagin would soon be put to the ultimate test in that regard. 
 
A Timeline of Destruction 
Tuesday, August 23rd  
The tropical system that will eventually become Katrina is first reported by the 
National Hurricane Center as it begins to form over The Bahamas.  It is the 12th such 
system of the year’s storm season (Drye, 2005). 
Thursday, August 25th  
Katrina is categorized as a Category 1 hurricane with winds exceeding 80 miles 
per hour and projected landfall in Florida.  Governor Jeb Bush, brother of the president, 
declares a state of emergency as a result (Rushton, 2015). 
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Friday, August 26th  
Katrina intensifies as it clears Florida and reaches the waters of the Gulf of 
Mexico.  Governor Blanco declares a state of emergency for Louisiana, as does 
Governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi, while the U.S. Coast Guard activates 400 
reservists to help combat the imminent threat (Gajanan & Brait, 2015). 
Saturday, August 27th  
Katrina has now strengthened into a Category 3 storm with sustained winds of 
115 miles per hour.  By the end of the day, it is only 300 miles from the mouth of the 
Mississippi River (PBS, 2005).  Nagin and Blanco hold a joint press conference to warn 
residents of the impending storm and declare a state of emergency, stopping short of 
ordering a full evacuation (Brinkley, 2006, pp. 625-626). 
Sunday, August 28th  
Katrina reaches Category 4 strength a little more than 24 hours before its 
eventual arrival on the Gulf Coast.  Less than 24 hours from Katrina making landfall in 
New Orleans, Nagin holds a press conference to issue a mandatory evacuation of the 
city and stress the storm’s imminent danger, calling it “the storm that most of us have 
feared” (Roberts, 2005).  By day’s end, approximately eighty percent of New Orleans 
has been evacuated, still leaving some 100,000 people stranded with no means of 
escape.  The Superdome begins to take in some of those left behind, providing much 
needed shelter from the high winds and heavy rainfall already assaulting the city 
(Brinkley, pp. 626-627). 
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Monday, August 29th 
Katrina makes landfall in the continental United States at approximately 6:10 
AM eastern time, completely wiping out the small Louisiana fishing hamlet of Buras 
and making short work of the makeshift levees built there (Horne, 2006, p. 41).  Almost 
instantly, the extent of the storm’s impact is underestimated; several local news outlet in 
New Orleans describe the damage as “much lighter than expected” due to the focus on 
the city’s more affluent neighborhoods such as the French Quarter and Garden District 
(Knauer, p. 39). 
Tuesday, August 30th 
In response to mounting political and media pressure, Blanco personally visits 
the Superdome and is “shocked” by the conditions she finds there (Knauer, p. 41).  
Hastily executed evacuation initiatives have already relocated more than 10,000 
displaced residents there with scarce provisions and security; that number will soon 
triple (Southern, 2007, p. 51). 
Wednesday, August 31st 
Conditions around the city continue to deteriorate as Nagin directs nearly all of 
the city’s 1,500 police officers to help combat the widespread looting taking place 
(Knauer, p. 43).  Meanwhile, Blanco orders a full and immediate evacuation of all 
remaining residents in New Orleans (Drye, 2005).   
Thursday, September 1st  
Nagin uses a live interview on CNN to implore the rest of the country for 
assistance; later in the day he would use a local radio show to chastise the federal 
response up to that point, including direct attacks on President Bush (Brinkley, pp. 634-
16 
635).  Feeling the pressure from the unsettling images on nationwide news broadcasts, 
government officials work to play damage control with the media.  FEMA Director 
Michael Brown orders FEMA to temporarily suspend rescue operations as escalating 
violence threatens worker safety (Rushton, 2015). 
Friday, September 2nd  
Neighboring states taking in Katrina evacuees are reaching their own capacities; 
Houston announces that it can no longer fill the Astrodome past the 11,000 people 
already being housed there (Brinkley, p. 636).  President Bush signs a congressional bill 
authorizing $150 billion in relief aid for the Gulf Coast as National Guard troops deliver 
much needed supplies to the throngs of people still stranded in New Orleans (Drye, 
2005). 
Saturday, September 3rd  
Growing outrage in the nation’s capital pushes Bush to order more than 7,000 
additional active duty troops into the Gulf region to assist with ongoing recovery 
efforts.  FEMA officials begrudgingly admit that the agency was “overwhelmed” by the 
scope of the storm and was not totally prepared to manage the aftermath (Gajanan, 
2015).  City emergency dispatchers are receiving more than 1,000 calls daily from 
stranded residents requesting assistance (PBS, 2005). 
Monday, September 5th  
One week removed from the storm, fewer than 10,000 residents are left in the 
city.  Despite the potential for abuse, FEMA pledges debit cards to victims for essential 
spending. Federal executive and legislative officials demand bi-partisan investigations 
into the botched Katrina handling (Gajanan, 2015). 
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The literary resources featured in this section effectively give a harrowing 
account of both Katrina’s power and its destructive impact on New Orleans and the rest 
of the Gulf Region.  This research proved critical in outlining some of the preliminary 
and reactive actions taken by Nagin and other officials in areas impacted by Katrina, 
and it also lays the groundwork for some significant problems in disaster management 
that those officials would have to address in the immediate aftermath of Katrina. 
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The Response 
The Local Level 
In the days immediately following the storm’s arrival, Nagin kept a high profile 
as the eyes of the world turned to New Orleans.  He held daily, seemingly hourly, press 
conferences to provide status updates and effectively utilized the news outlets swarming 
the city to his advantage.  Perhaps the most potent use of that presence was taking to the 
TV and radio airways to criticize the sluggish emergency response as well as demand 
more resources necessary for a more efficient recovery.  Considering what followed, 
this can be viewed as a highpoint for Nagin in his handling of the crisis; it has been said 
that his critiques “not only helped to frame Katrina as a failed response effort by the 
federal government, but it also created outrage among the public and in the media” 
(Griffin-Padgett & Allison, 2010, p. 389).  Nagin’s aggressive use of the media 
strengthened his ability to inform a wider audience on the numerous issues facing his 
city in the days immediately following the storm.  Calling attention to those issues, 
especially slow dispersal of aid resources and inadequate assistance from higher level 
governments, also strengthened his position to call for better resources to solve 
problems under his purview as mayor.  The steps of disaster response outlined in the 
literature review require substantial coordination and cooperation between multiple 
entities; Nagin airing his frustrations, as uncouth as his approach might have been, 
showed an initiative and desire to make those steps more effective.  Unfortunately, 
things would go downhill from there. 
After a strong showing in the early stages of the disaster management, evidence 
points to instances of New Orleans’ mayor becoming increasingly erratic and derelict in 
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his duties.  The criticism has started even before that, especially as a result of his 
waiting until the day before Katrina’s eventual landfall to finally issue a city-wide 
mandatory evacuation order as previously stated.  One city councilman would later 
recount his own growing frustrations after several unproductive meetings with Nagin 
intended to discuss pertinent relief matters, saying “there was this lack of engagement, 
this lack of urgency” and that he simply “walked away more angry” after each 
subsequent encounter due to a lack of sufficient progress.  Cause for concern was more 
than abundant, not the least of which being displaced citizens and widespread lack of 
essential utilities such as electricity and running water (Rivlin, p. 185). 
The decision making, communication and problem solving initiatives shown by 
Nagin via his earlier press interviews were lacking in the referenced account by one of 
his council members.  Whether this described attitude was the result of indifference or 
fatigue, it did not help to address the necessary steps of disaster management.  While he 
should have been overseeing the initial rebuilding process and restoration of vital 
services interrupted by the storm, he was disengaged at a time when his guidance was 
greatly needed.  It would not be long before the “undesirable consequences” of absent 
leadership alluded to in the literature review would become a reality. 
The city's overwhelmed and undermanned police department also began to crack 
under the strain of the events around them.  Questions began to arise concerning the 
department's ability to perform its duties, indicating a gaping lack of oversight and 
accountability from its senior officials (Adams, 2005, p. 27).  Several news sources 
reported a mass exodus of officers simply walking off the job due to fatigue and stress.  
Eddie Compass, superintendent of the New Orleans police department and the city’s 
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highest ranking law enforcement official, was reportedly spotted leaving the city 
himself to get medical attention for his pregnant wife and leaving a leadership void in 
the process.  (Horne, pp. 108-109).  Many others who did stay were witnessed ignoring 
store looters or even taking part in the looting themselves; in one instance, officers and 
paramedics forcibly removed citizens from a Wal-Mart and began stealing items by the 
truck load (Horne, p. 123).  In a separate and even more disturbing incident several 
weeks after Katrina’s landfall, a news cameraman captured footage of three white city 
police officers viciously attacking a handcuffed elderly black man; when his presence 
was finally noticed, the cameraman himself was assaulted by one of the officers and 
told to “go home” (Southern, p. 109). 
Could—or should—Nagin and his officials have foreseen the traumatizing 
impact of Katrina’s aftermath on the city’s law enforcement personnel?  It is a pretty 
telling sign of a bad situation when the city’s senior police officer leaves his post, even 
if it was for the very natural reason of helping his family.  According to at least one 
journal, the breakdown in order and discipline amongst NOPD officers was predictable, 
perhaps even inevitable.  The journal frames the actions of these officers within the 
“Chaos Theory”, a sociological concept that comes from “observing chaotic and 
unpredictable patterns” over a period of time (Adams & Stewart, 2014, p. 416).  It 
essentially holds that exposure to traumatic events like Katrina can lead to bifurcations, 
or changes within a system of order that lead to changes in behavior; those bifurcations 
can be subtle or cataclysmic (pp. 416-417).  In this case, the bifurcation was the 
breakdown in police conduct and the change was extremely consequential.  The journal 
article concludes that the aftermath of Katrina was an especially dangerous and hectic 
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situation, one that perfectly lent itself to the Chaos Theory.  It part, it states “society 
demands that the police function even in unexpected and dynamic situations…however, 
the damaged infrastructure of the NOPD severely hampered the functions of this first 
responder agency during the Katrina disaster…the chaotic nature of the situation came 
to a critical point where it was nearly impossible to make sense out of the current flow 
of events” (p. 428). 
The first-hand exposure to death, destruction and unrest that follows a disaster 
like Katrina puts incalculable stress on individuals whose occupations already expose 
them to imminent danger; combine that stress of worrying about their own family 
members, and it certainly stands to reason that some exodus of police and other 
emergency responders can happen in such situations.  However, instances of abuse and 
blatant illegal activity are never acceptable under any circumstances or conditions.  
When Nagin relegated virtually the entire city’s remaining police force to protect 
businesses from looting, he not only took attention away from citizens in need but 
exposed his officers to even more unrest and disorder at the hands of desperate citizens.  
It was a very questionable problem solving decision, one that attempted to address one 
issue at the expense of another equally vexing issue. 
If Nagin had not done enough to stir up controversy prior to January 16, 2006, 
he certainly succeeded in doing so after it.  On that fateful day, the politically bruised 
mayor gave an address in recognition of Martin Luther King Day that brought him 
further condemnation and scrutiny.  After starting his remarks on a high note by urging 
his citizens to reach a more united front in the wake of Katrina, Nagin began to 
incorporate the slain civil rights icon into the mix by wondering aloud what he would 
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think of the situation.  He then began wading into dangerous waters with statements 
about how Katrina and the other hurricanes before it were signs that “God is angry at 
America”, a contention that clearly did not sit well with those in attendance.  From 
there, he uttered two words which would come back to haunt him in a big way: “we ask 
black people: it’s time.  It’s time for us to come together.  It’s time for us to rebuild a 
New Orleans, the one that should be a chocolate New Orleans.  And I don’t care what 
people are saying uptown or wherever they are.  This city will be chocolate at the end of 
the day” (Rivlin, p. 242).  Chocolate city.  Those two words drowned out every other 
utterance in the address, not to mention any well-intentioned efforts behind it.   
A national Gallup poll found that nearly half of white respondents and seventeen 
percent of African-American respondents were offended by Nagin’s “chocolate city” 
remark (Lay, 2009, pp. 652-653).  Inside New Orleans, the numbers were much more 
forgiving; eighty percent of residents who responded to a local poll said they were not 
offended by his remarks, while fifty-nine percent of the black respondents had a 
favorable opinion of him (Rivlin, p. 244).  Some pundits coined the phrase “Ray Speak” 
to describe Nagin’s acerbic oratory style, one that alienated many outside of New 
Orleans but actually managed to solidify support among a significant portion of the 
city’s minority community (Koven, 2010, p. 354).  Another notable incident of “Ray 
Speak” came just two days after Katrina landfall during a call to a local radio station; 
during the subsequent interview, he implored Blanco and Bush to “get off their asses” 
and “fix the biggest goddamn crisis in the history of the country” (p. 346).  It was the 
epitome of a “shoot first, ask questions later” mentality that showed both his growing 
personal frustrations and his penchant for being needlessly provocative. 
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The “chocolate city” remark can charitably be described as a poor choice of 
words at a time when such a mistake could hardly be afforded.  It was an unforced error 
in decision making that made for perfect fodder for an overzealous news media with a 
penchant for sensationalism.  Nagin spent much of the following days responding to 
complaints and requests for clarification on his use of the phrase, eventually leading 
him to admit that the remark was “totally inappropriate” (Roig-Franzia, 2006).  The 
incident detracted from his ability to inform and impart vital information because it 
forced him to dwell on a trivial subject when his attention should have been focused 
elsewhere.  While Nagin clearly suffered a lapse in judgment, the ensuing media 
attention kept him from fully executing his crisis management responsibilities; the harsh 
criticism that ensued unduly impacted his ability to carry out those responsibilities and 
unduly impacted a city still reeling from the worst disaster in its history. 
 
The State Level 
Aside from her actions in declaring a state of emergency, Governor Blanco 
dropped the ball in other areas under her purview and found herself on the receiving end 
of considerable scrutiny as a result.  It later came to light that her request to the White 
House for National Guard troops to assist with relief efforts lacked in necessary 
specificity; she acknowledged that she did not adequately indicate what type of soldiers 
were needed. "Nobody told me that I had to request that," she explained when 
responding to the issue, "I thought that I had requested everything they had. We were 
living in a war zone by then” (Lipton, Schmitt & Shanker, 2005).  In a separate incident, 
the director of the National Hurricane Center contacted Blanco to apprise her of 
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Katrina’s pending assault on the state, specifically New Orleans and the region directly 
bordering the Gulf of Mexico; she responded by bluntly telling him to reach Nagin and 
deal with him instead (Brinkley, p. 58). 
 
The Federal Level 
FEMA bore a significant amount of the load for allocating essential emergency 
supplies and making sure they arrived at their intended destinations.  The same day 
Katrina visited her wrath upon New Orleans, Governor Blanco personally contacted 
President Bush asking for that very assistance.  She emphasized the urgency of the 
situation simply but unequivocally: “we need everything you’ve got”.  Her office 
received assurance from FEMA that it had 500 buses ready to shuttle residents out of 
New Orleans; almost two full days after storm landfall, those buses still had not been 
made available.  The transportation situation became dire enough that Blanco’s chief of 
staff emailed junior staffers personally asking them to “find buses that can go to NO 
(New Orleans) ASAP (Warrick, Hull & Hsu, 2005).  It was not until days later that any 
meaningful deployment of buses materialized.   
Louisiana National Guard troops asked for supply shipments to begin dispersing 
food and other necessities to the Superdome and elsewhere throughout the city, but 
there was one slight problem: FEMA had staged the cargo of goods at Camp 
Beauregard, a three hour one-way drive from New Orleans.  And as if that were not bad 
enough, there were only enough provisions to last a single day.  An Army Corps of 
Engineers official found that also requested supplies were also lacking as requested.  
FEMA had promised to procure one hundred portable generators for installation in 
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critical areas to combat the inevitable loss of electrical power once the storm hit; when 
the official arrived at Beauregard to retrieve them, the agency had provided only fifty.  
Previous hurricane scenario drills estimated that two hundred trucks of food, water and 
tarps would be needed to address bare minimum needs throughout the state; on Sunday 
the 28th, the day before Katrina hit, FEMA had only fifty-eight such trucks in place and 
fully equipped (Cooper, pp. 119-120).  These various failures to provide even the most 
basic of relief aid, despite advanced warnings and plans in place, showed just how 
unprepared Brown and his entire agency were to adequately respond to Katrina.  
The chaotic and bungled management of Katrina’s aftermath brought Brown 
into the national spotlight for all the wrong reasons.  Like Nagin and Blanco, he was all 
but unknown to the public before Katrina’s aftermath thrust him into the international 
media spotlight.  And like Nagin and Blanco, he also had little previous experience 
equal to the monumental task brought on by Katrina’s aftermath.  On the day of 
Katrina’s arrival, he met with Blanco and told her “don’t worry about costs” while 
appropriating the necessary aid; along with the hundreds of buses he promised, he also 
pledged more than $20,000 in subsidies for each house destroyed by storm damage, 
much of which was never delivered (Horne, p. 95).   
Other aspects of Brown’s performance became cause for concern, aside from 
him being “unaware of the immediate needs” of those suffering in New Orleans 
(Martinko, Breaux, Martinez, Summers, & Harvey, 2009, p. 52).  He had developed a 
reputation as “bureaucratically adept” while also possessing a tendency to be “smug and 
arrogant” (Rivlin, p. 38), traits that do not always make a productive combination.  
News outlets obtained copies of emails he sent to various FEMA officials that seemed 
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to trivialize the situation.  After a staffer in the ground in New Orleans advised him that 
essential commodities were in short supply and deaths were imminent without 
immediate intervention, Brown flippantly replied “thanks for the update” (Koven, p. 
352).  Actions like these caused even his allies within the federal government to 
acknowledge his “weak-kneed” approach to command (Brinkley, p. 269), and one 
analysis concluded “it is apparent that Brown was not qualified for that post” (Ink, 
2006, p. 803) in its review of the response efforts. 
These incidents did not stop President Bush from giving some infamous praise 
to Brown during a press conference that became one of the defining moments of the 
Katrina aftermath.  His off-the-cuff and informal remark—“Brownie, you’re doing a 
heckuva job” (Brinkley, pp. 546-548)—quickly gathered criticism and scrutiny similar 
to that of Nagin’s “chocolate city” quip several months later.  The president clearly had 
honorable intentions of wanting to boost the beleaguered FEMA head’s spirits in the 
midst of a very stressful period, but the remark became a lightning rod of controversy in 
an already tense situation.  The comment was described as “surreal” and lending to 
“very negative perceptions of government performance” (Nicholls, p. 352).  The timing 
of the compliment was especially bad when considering the predicaments facing 
thousands of citizens in New Orleans, and it hinted at a serious disconnect with the 
reality of the situation at hand. 
How did these actions impact Nagin’s ability to manage the disaster at the local 
level?  First, let us analyze the performance of Blanco and the state level.  Her failure to 
properly request National Guard troops during a state of emergency dealt a significant 
blow to the restoration of law and order within New Orleans, not to mention the tension 
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it undoubtedly created between Nagin and her office.  The relationship between the two 
administrations would not have been helped much by her insistence that he bear the 
responsibility of communicating with the National Hurricane Center director instead of 
jointly cooperating with his correspondences.  Such actions took away from his ability 
to properly address the significant problems facing his city and his people. 
The missteps of Brown and other officials at the federal level would have placed 
even greater strains on Nagin’s post-Katrina management efficiency.  Misplacement 
and shortage of vital aid resources, failure to deliver on promised provisions and poor 
attitudes regarding their own responsibilities all contributed to a lackluster performance 
on behalf of the United States government.  President Bush’s well intended but ill-
advised “Brownie” remark only added rhetorical fuel to the fire in that its contribution 
to the aforementioned “negative perceptions of government performance” would have 
affected the trust between Nagin and his citizens.  Any deterioration in perception of 
government performance is deterioration in trust, which leads to deterioration in 
effective communication.  The mismanagement of resources provided by FEMA would 
have burdened Nagin’s decisions on how to most effectively use them, especially when 
they were lacking in the necessary quantities as indicated in the research literature.  
Such shortages would have only created more problems rather than solving them in a 
timely and efficient manner. 
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The Aftermath 
The “Blame Game” 
While the key players conveyed images of optimism in front of the media, the 
mood behind the scenes was anything but cheery; to say tensions were high in the days 
and weeks following Katrina would be a huge understatement.  Nagin accused It did not 
take long to hear claims that what happened was entirely foreseeable.  As one writer put 
it, “the vulnerability of New Orleans and its residents to major hurricanes was well 
understood within the research community and among many journalists and media 
organizations, and disaster management practitioners at all levels of government” 
(Tierney, 2008, p. 180).   
It seemed that there was more than enough evidence to justify the sharp 
criticisms being leveled against everyone involved, even if those criticisms were 
politically motivated in nature.  GOP leaders at the federal level sought to portray 
Democrats Nagin and Blanco as incompetent and feckless in their respective roles, 
allegations which have already been noted in previous sections.  The Republicans in 
Washington specifically targeted Nagin for failing to fully and expediently deploy his 
own convoy of school buses for evacuation and emergency transportation purposes 
(Horne, p. 94).  Blanco by stating that she never properly requested the FEMA 
assistance needed to deal with the crisis in her state.  In response, local leaders in 
Louisiana accused Washington and the White House of playing party politics with their 
assistance allocations.  Some asserted that neighboring Mississippi, equally beset by 
damages from Katrina, experienced faster and more organized efforts from federal 
emergency assistance mechanisms because Governor Barbour happened to be a 
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Republican (Maestas, Atkeson, Croom & Bryant, 2008, p. 615).  During one of Bush’s 
visits there, Governor Barbour went so far as to say “the federal government has been 
great” in fulfilling its promised aid to the state (Koven, p. 347).  Whether these reported 
discrepancies in performance results were by design or influenced other factors, they 
are hard to ignore.   
In his book Come Hell or High Water, Michael Eric Dyson described a 
particularly emotional meeting between the three leaders aboard Air Force One 
approximately one week into the aftermath stage.  According to Dyson, Nagin took the 
opportunity to both apologize to Bush for some harsh comments he had made about the 
commander-in-chief in media interviews several days prior and confront him about his 
plans to handle the immense crisis before them.  Bush admitted fault from the federal 
level and pledged to him that “we’re gonna fix it”.  The discussion would eventually 
take a dramatic turn, one that included a visibly frustrated Nagin pounding his fist on a 
table and exclaiming “we just need to cut through this and do what it takes to have a 
more-controlled command structure.  If that means federalizing it, let’s do it”.  This 
obviously undermined Blanco’s authority in overseeing the relief efforts taking place in 
her own state.  After she requested to talk to the president privately on the issue, Nagin 
again lost his composure and said “why don’t you do that now?” before the meeting 
abruptly ended.  A Bush aide present at the meeting later quipped that it was “as blunt 
as you can get without the Secret Service getting involved” (pp. 102-103). 
In true bureaucratic fashion, Congress had its own say in the conversation.  Less 
than one month after the storm, the House of Representatives approved the formation of 
a bi-partisan committee to investigate response measures and actions performed at all 
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involved levels of government.  The committee’s report, released approximately six 
months after the storm, reached devastating conclusions.  The administrations of Nagin, 
Blanco and Bush all received excoriating performance reviews from the committee; one 
of the most damning conclusions referred to the overall management of Katrina as “a 
litany of mistakes, misjudgments, lapses, and absurdities all cascading together, 
blinding us to what was coming and hobbling any collective effort to respond” (Ink, p. 
800).    
The thorough and detailed nature of the report left the impression that “too many 
leaders failed to lead” as one analysis put it, adding that “critical time was wasted on 
issues of no importance to disaster response, such as winning the blame game, waging a 
public relations battle or debating the advantage of wardrobe choices” (Morris, 2007, p. 
43).  The committee’s report specifically cited Nagin and Blanco for waiting until 
Katrina was only 19 hours from landfall to order a mandatory evacuation of New 
Orleans, even though advisory warnings had been in place for two days.  The two 
leaders were also singled out for poorly executed evacuation plans to accommodate 
citizens with no private means of transportation or those unable to evacuate themselves 
(Ink, p. 801).  It is estimated that late or inefficient evacuation of nursing homes led to 
the deaths of 75 senior citizens in New Orleans and throughout the state (Horne, p. 91). 
The levees around New Orleans became a battleground of considerable scrutiny 
in the weeks that followed.  The storm’s ferocity overtook them almost immediately and 
the proceeding floods worsened the already cataclysmic conditions as well as hopes for 
prompt rescue efforts.  The levee system was constructed to endure Category 3 storm 
surges similar to ones simulated in the Hurricane Pam exercise; however, downtown 
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areas near the system’s western edges encountered breaches from storms consistent 
with only a Category 1 strength.  Two different teams of experts independently 
presented concurring evidence which indicated the city’s western levees gave way long 
before storm waters reached their tops, a devastating conclusion given the damages that 
transpired as a result.  Acknowledged hurricane expert and author Ivor van Heerden 
encapsulated the levee situation in succinct fashion: “this was a preventable disaster” 
(Kintisch, 2005, p. 953). 
There is much information to consider from the literary sources included in this 
section, but it essentially be condensed down to one thing: there is more than one person 
at fault for what happened during the Katrina response, and Congress went on record to 
proclaim as such.  Partisan political views are likely to play a significant role in how 
one parses out the majority of blame, but there should be little room for doubt that 
officials on both sides of the political aisle failed to fully execute their roles.  Sadly, it 
should be expected that finger-pointing and excuse making will inevitably arise from 
such a grossly mishandled situation which created so much controversy.  That does not 
make the behavior of the key players any more acceptable, nor does it make the findings 
of the research any more palatable.   
Where does all of this leave Nagin in the blame department?  The performances 
of others notwithstanding, it appears clear that he could have done more to influence 
and control activities under his direct control.  The overall management of city 
resources, from law enforcement to transportation, and his own conduct are direct 
reflections of how ill-prepared he was to deal with the situation, both personally and 
professionally.  Poor decisions were made, communication was lacking or unproductive 
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in some instances and serious problems were not fully addressed.  Squabbling with 
Bush and Blanco aboard Air Force One might have helped him vent some long penned-
up anger, but it did little to alleviate the present situation beyond that.  At least one post-
Katrina analysis gave a slight reprieve to FEMA in one aspect of its considerable 
failures, implying that distribution of basic essentials such as fresh water should fall 
under the purview of state and local authorities rather than Washington (Landy, 2008, p. 
155).  There certainly should have been some reserve of resources in place within the 
city with a clear dissemination plan of how those resources would be used and who 
would receive them; no one should have expected federal assistance to be immediate or 
fully adequate to fulfill each individual need at the local level, especially considering 
bureaucratic roadblocks that often surface when the federal government is involved.  
While it would be grossly unfair—not to mention factually wrong—to blame Nagin for 
everything that went wrong during the post-Katrina debacle, he is not without some 
level of culpability for shortcomings in his own actions. 
 
The Political Fallout 
The professional consequences for the key players involved in Katrina’s 
aftermath were considerable, an indication of how poorly the situation was managed 
and how negative the public reaction came to be as a result.  For Blanco, Katrina 
became a political albatross that she would never completely vanquish.  By October, 
less than two months removed from the crisis, her statewide approval rating had 
plummeted 17 points from where it registered just prior to August 29th (Rivlin, 2015, p. 
165).  Plagued by a tarnished public image and bipartisan scapegoating, Blanco 
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announced that she would not seek a second term in the following year’s election 
(Waugh, p. 112).  The hard feelings towards Blanco resurfaced even after she gave up 
the fight for re-election.  Republican Bobby Jindal, whom she defeated in the 2003 
gubernatorial election, won his follow-up bid for the governor's mansion in 2007; polls 
later indicated that lingering disappointment with Blanco's performance two years 
earlier played a significant role in his victory (Cowan & McGuire, 2008, p. 288). 
Like Blanco, Brown’s career would not recover from his administration’s 
missteps.  On September 12, 2005, he announced his official resignation as FEMA 
director; this came three days after he had been relieved of his primary relief oversight 
duties.  The announcement came in the midst of mounting pressure for him to step 
down, and he obliged as a way of helping the already embattled agency avoid further 
distractions.  The move was widely met with derision for his efforts; among others, The 
New York Times panned his ineptitude and disparaged his lack of proper experience in 
its analysis of his performance (Stevenson, 2005). 
While Brown served as the immediate casualty of the federal government’s 
impotent handling of Katrina, Bush’s stock suffered greatly as well.  It was not until 
two weeks after the storm that he delivered his first major statement on Katrina to the 
nation, a delay that some interpreted as a transparent lack of concern (Benoit & Henson, 
2009, p. 41).  Ultimately weakened by criticisms stemming from Katrina and dwindling 
public support for the costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he left the White House less 
than four years later with a paltry thirty-four percent approval rating (Saad, 2009). 
 Nagin’s Katrina antics helped him go from a shoo-in for re-election to an 
extremely vulnerable incumbent; by the time his party primary came around in April of 
34 
the following year, there were twenty-two challengers to his nomination (Lay, 2009, p. 
650).  Even though he managed to survive an uphill battle and secure a second term as 
mayor, he did so with far less support than when he first came into office.  His 
popularity would steadily decline throughout his second term, punctuated by public 
frustration with his frequent out-of-town trips for business not pertinent to his mayoral 
duties.  He made national headlines again in 2014, this time for criminal conviction on 
twenty different charges stemming from official misconduct during his time in office.  
The charges ranged from fraud to bribe receiving to conspiracy as a result of improper 
favors to city contractors carried out over several years.  He is currently serving a 10 
year prison sentence in a Texas state prison; his attorneys filed an appeal last year 
which is still pending (Pao, 2015). 
Nagin’s fall from grace is a stunning and sad epilogue to what once appeared to 
be a promising political career.  While the other key players did see their careers 
adversely affected by Katrina’s fallout, they at least managed to avoid punitive 
consequences as a result of their actions.  The nature of the charges successfully 
brought against Nagin certainly adds another level of intrigue and scrutiny to his actions 
in the midst of the crisis.  His illegal dealings bring his leadership and decision making 
record during Katrina into question; furthermore, his current dilemma begs the obvious 
question of whether he always engaged in such practices or if he came into them later in 
his career as a way of protecting his political capital.  Did Nagin wake up one day and 
just decide to exploit the power of his office for his own advantage, or did he do so 
from the very beginning, even during a period of tremendous destruction and suffering?  
At this point, only he knows the answer to that question. 
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New Orleans and lessons learned a decade later 
Ten years later, New Orleans is still a city on the mend.  While the remnants of 
Katrina can still be seen in many areas, the people of the Big Easy have made great 
strides in bringing it back from the brink of elimination.  That process has not been 
without its challenges.  Three years to the day after Katrina’s deadliest landfall, citizens 
of the Gulf region experienced an unfriendly case of déjà vu when Hurricane Gustav 
hit; fortunately, the damage was far less severe this time around and evacuation 
procedures were much better organized (Taylor, 2010, p. 496).  Setbacks are to be 
expected when dealing with disaster recovery on a city-wide scale; changing weather 
climates, political malfeasance and destabilized populations are just a few such setbacks 
facing the people of New Orleans in their own rebuilding efforts (p. 501).  Census data 
indicated that the city's population expanded by 40,000 people between 2010 and 2014, 
a total increase of almost twelve percent (United States Census Bureau, n.d.).  It is not 
where it once was, but it is getting there slowly and surely. 
In the end, Katrina and its resulting devastation “exposed various shortcomings 
in the existing planning and strategies to cope with large-scale disaster” (Banipal, 2006, 
p. 493) in the United States.  The highly controversial nature of the response led to 
some meaningful changes in the form of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management 
Reform Act of 2006.  FEMA, the source of much derision for its role in the bungled 
response, was especially impacted by the reforms; one of the most significant changes 
made it so that future directors of the agency must be specifically qualified 
professionals rather than political appointees (Miller, 2012, p. 135).  The desire to avoid 
another Michael Brown situation could not be much more obvious 
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Analysis 
      Now that the relevant researched information has been presented, it is time to 
provide some analysis within the framework of the posed research questions.  The 
primary research question at the center of this project focused on how government 
failures during the relief efforts of Hurricane Katrina impacted Ray Nagin and his 
ability to adequately manage the aftermath.  The research stage included sources that 
dealt with emergency management and leadership responsibility roles, namely some of 
the basic duties that officials should perform in times of disaster.  There were systems in 
place that identified Katrina well in advance of it making landfall in the United States, 
but the levees of New Orleans were not able to withstand its force.  Food, water, shelter 
and other essential items that should have been provided in the response phase were 
delayed or altogether lacking in some instances.  Research showed that the restoration 
to normal of utilities and other essential services was also a slow process in some areas, 
and the rebuilding of New Orleans continues to be a work in progress. 
 The introduction posed three grouped sub-questions to further assess the 
performances of government officials in response to Katrina.  To recap, those questions 
are: 
 Who were the key players and what were their roles? 
 What are some specific examples found during the research phase of leadership 
failures that can be attributed to the key players or their representatives? 
 How did these specific examples of leadership failure impact the management of 
the Katrina response? 
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The key players were chosen on the basis of the positions they held within their 
respective levels of government, their authority to make critical policy decisions and 
their level of visibility with the general public.  A city mayor, state governor, director of 
a major federal agency and the President of the United States are certainly offices which 
wield significant power when it comes to the safety of citizens.  The literary sources 
researched for this project devoted much, or virtually all in some cases, of their focus to 
scrutinizing the actions of these individuals.  That attention was justified by the quantity 
and relevance of the information gathered from these sources.  Any analysis of the 
Hurricane Katrina relief efforts should include those four individuals at an absolute 
minimum and scrutinize their actions above all others. 
Several examples of poor emergency management execution, many brought on by 
deficiencies in preparation and communication, have been brought forth and discussed 
at length for each government hierarchy represented in the Katrina response.  From 
New Orleans all the way to the White House, the research literature enumerated 
mistakes and lapses in judgment attributable to each of the featured key players.  Based 
on the extensive research conducted for this project, the conclusion can be made that 
these mistakes had a severely detrimental impact on the overall effectiveness of Katrina 
relief efforts and the citizens of New Orleans.  The ineptitude and poor planning of 
FEMA managed to deprive Katrina survivors of precious commodities while wasting 
much needed government resources.  The hurried evacuation initiative which packed  
tens of thousands of people into the Superdome created deplorable conditions that 
exposed residents to even more hardships.  Leaders were often quick to “pass the buck” 
and let others take responsibility for decisions that were theirs to make.  Rhetoric from 
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elected and appointed government officials angered constituents and distracted from 
recovery efforts at hand.  These unfortunate occurrences are consequences of the failed 
leadership abilities exhibited by the key players and their offices. 
The key government players were identified, specific examples of leadership 
failures within each level of government were provided and some of the significant 
consequences of these leadership failures were also identified.  From those provided 
examples, the mistakes made by prominent government officials and agencies should be 
evident; the repercussions of those mistakes should also be evident.  All of the key 
players experienced professional and personal setbacks as a result 
 Finally, it is necessary to analyze how the research and cited sources addressed 
the primary research question.  Through a combination of many factors and 
circumstances, it should be clear that were indeed many significant leadership failures 
in the response to Hurricane Katrina.  Services were denied, resources were misused, 
policies were ignored and lives were ultimately lost when they could—and should—
have been saved.  These failures created equally significant consequences for the people 
of New Orleans.  Some of those failures—a belated mandatory evacuation order and 
lack of control in curbing urban unrest chief among them—originated at the local level 
with Mayor Nagin and his administration, while others were the fault of higher ranking 
entities at the state and federal levels.   
While his response and performance was far from perfect, Nagin’s efforts to 
serve his city were considerably hampered by performances from his superiors.  His 
abilities to make critical decisions, communicate and solve problems were severely 
impacted by external factors beyond his control before, during and after the storm.  
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Even a flawlessly executed local response could not have minimized the damage to 
New Orleans under such circumstances.  It should be clear that there were indeed made 
by the involved key players, and there should also be no doubt that these mistakes had a 
negative impact on the Katrina relief efforts and those who experienced them firstand. 
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Conclusion 
The overall intent of this thesis has been to shed light on a very dark time in our 
history’s history by gathering information from reliable sources and applying an 
impartial analysis to what it all meant.  The question posed in the introduction—did 
failures at all levels of government, in both its prelude and aftermath, contribute to 
the damage of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans?—guided the research process 
throughout.  There are, understandably, strong emotions and opinions attached to the 
events that unfolded during that fateful week in the Gulf Region and the impact is still 
evident more than a decade later.  It is this author’s contention that the research 
discussed here has provided an informative and unbiased look at the culpability owned 
by the various government administrations involved in the post-Katrina relief efforts.  
There is room for debate as to who is most liable in their actions or lack thereof, but it 
should be very evident that more could have been done by the key players involved to 
ease the suffering of those most affected by the storm’s wrath.  Mayor Nagin, Governor 
Blanco, President Bush and Director Brown fell short of their duties—in some cases, 
drastically short—in managing the agencies and emergency management procedures 
under their respective purviews; numerous publications and reflections from the parties 
involved, not to mention Congress, bear out this inconvenient truth.   
This thesis has shown that the people responsible for providing help to those in 
need made a bad situation worse through both incompetence and hubris.  Its findings 
are relevant to the study of leadership because they provide a blueprint of what not to do 
in the midst of a crisis.  Good leaders do not run from a problem; they embrace it and 
learn from it.  Good leaders do not look to shift blame and avoid the scrutiny they are 
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due; they accept responsibility and face criticism when it is valid.  Good leaders do not 
put ambition or reputation first; they place the needs and welfare of those whom they 
lead above their own.  These are not insignificant talking points, but principles that 
mean the difference between success and failure.  And in the case of Katrina, they were 
the difference between life and death for many.  The mistakes detailed throughout this 
thesis are numerous, but if there is one silver lining in them it is the possibility that they 
can serve as lessons for leaders in addressing future tragedies.  These errors cannot and 
must not be repeated; the potential consequences of doing so are too dire to permit 
otherwise. 
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